There have been attempts to resurrect the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL). The original FTPL rests on a fundamental compounded fallacy: confusing the intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) of the State, holding with equality and with sovereign bonds priced at their contractual values, with a misspecified equilibrium nominal bond pricing equation, and the 'double use' of this IBC. This fallacy generates a number of internal inconsistencies and anomalies. The issue is not an empirical one. Neither does it concern the realism of the assumptions. It is about flawed internal logic. The issue is not just of academic interest. If fiscal policy authorities were to take the FTPL seriously, costly policy accidents, including sovereign default and hyperinflation, could be the outcome. Interpreting the FTPL as an equilibrium selection mechanism in models with multiple equilibria does not help. Attempts by Sims to extend the FTPL to models with nominal price rigidities fail. The attempted resurrection of the FTPL fails. It is time to bury it again -for the last time.
(1) Introduction ( 
1.A.) The original FTPL
The fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) was developed in the 1990s and early 2000s by a number of distinguished economists, among them Leeper (1991) , Sims (1994 Sims ( , 1999a , Woodford (1994 Woodford ( , 1995 Woodford ( , 1996 Woodford ( , 1998a Woodford ( , b, c, 1999 Woodford ( , 2001 ) and Cochrane (1999, 2001, 2005) ). It was further discussed and developed by many others, e.g. Cushing (1999) , Loyo (1999) , Kocherlakota and Phelan (2000) , Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) , Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2000) and McCallum (2001) . The FTPL was quite popular for a number of years, with extensions to open-economy settings (see e.g. Sims (1999b Sims ( , 2001 , Bergin (2000) , Dupor (2000) and Daniel (2001) ), although there were few, if any, attempts at empirical verification of its observable implications.
The original FTPL proposed an alternative theory of the determination of the general price level in a dynamic monetary general equilibrium model with freely flexible nominal prices. This version of the FTPL was shown to be a fallacy by Buiter (1998 Buiter ( , 1999 Buiter ( , 2001 Buiter ( , 2002 Buiter ( and 2005 , Niepelt (2004) and Daniel (2007) . We shall focus here on Buiter's arguments. The original FTPL was based on an elementary but fatal error: it confused a budget constraint with an equilibrium condition. Specifically, it confused the intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) of the State (the consolidated general government and central bank), with a misspecified equilibrium sovereign nominal bond pricing equation.
The original FTPL asserted that the IBC of the State, holding with equality and with government bonds priced at their contractual (i.e. free of default risk) values, determines the general price level. The equilibrium value of the general price level equates the real value of the outstanding stock(s) of nominal government bonds (priced at their contractual values) to the present discounted value of anticipated future augmented primary surpluses of the State. 1 The authors of the original FTPL did not recognize that this 'additional' equilibrium condition -that the IBC of the State holds with equality, with sovereign bonds priced at their contractual values -had already been used elsewhere in the model: it is an implication of the equilibrium real resource constraint and the IBC of the representative consumer, holding with equality and with bonds priced at their contractual values. This IBC holds with equality when household consumption and money demand are derived from the optimizing behavior of forward-looking households with rational expectations, when there is non-satiation in real money balances and/or consumption.
The aforementioned fatal fallacy was at times compounded with other confusions, including, first, the identification of the FTPL with "fiscal dominance" or "active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy"' in a game-theoretic view of the interaction of monetary and fiscal authorities (see e.g. Leeper (1991) , and Bassetto (2002) ); second, the interpretation of the FTPL as an equilibrium selection mechanism when there are multiple equilibria (Kocherlakota and Phelan (2000) ); and, third, identifying the FTPL with the (perfectly coherent) view of the determination of the price level and the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy in the famous "Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic" model of Sargent and Wallace (1981) . That model has a 'second policy regime' -'fiscal dominance' -when the public debt to GDP ratio and the 1 Primary surpluses are non-interest revenues net of non-interest expenditures. The augmented primary surplus of the State is the primary surplus of the State plus the value of the change in the stock of central bank money, minus any interest paid on central bank money.
(1.C.) What the FTPL is not ( 
1.C.a.) Unanticipated inflation and/or financial repression can reduce the real value of nominal public debt
In standard/conventional monetary economics, a change in the general price level changes the real value of the outstanding stock of nominal bonds. Indeed, when faced with imminent default on its debt, a government may opt for monetary financing of its deficits. Inflation that was unanticipated at the time that fixed-rate nominal debt was issued can cause the realized real interest rate to be lower than was expected when the debt was issued. Financial repression (keeping nominal interest rates artificially low) can result in a reduction in the real value of current and future nominal debt service even if the inflation is anticipated, because it stops nominal interest rates from rising with expected inflation. This accounted for a sizeable part of the reduction in debt-to-GDP ratios after World War II in the United Kingdom, the United States and in many other countries. But, this has nothing to do with the FTPL.
In Japan today, the monetary authorities target the yield curve -they set a minus 0.1 percent, interest rate on Policy-Rate Balances in financial institutions' deposit accounts at the Bank of Japan and target the yield on ten-year government bonds at near zero percent. The ten-year government bond market is one of the most liquid markets in Japan and assuming that risk premia are relatively small, the ten-year rate should be close to the average expected short-term policy rate over the next ten years. Thus, the overnight rate is expected to average near zero over the next ten years. If the markets expect a successful attainment of the two percent inflation target starting, say, two years from now, this would mean the average term premium over the next ten years is expected to be about minus 1.6 percent. However, term premia in liquid markets cannot be manipulated in such a significant and persistent manner just by varying the net supplies. Indeed, in Sims (2011) the strict expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates links the price of a nominal perpetuity to the expected future path of instantaneous policy rate. This looks like classic financial repression.
(
1.C.b) The fiscal theory of seigniorage: monetary policy has an unavoidable fiscal dimension
The size and composition of the balance sheet of the central bank have unavoidable fiscal implications. The fiscal theory of seigniorage is the right way of thinking about the inherent fiscal dimension of monetary policy (see Buiter (2003 Buiter ( , 2007 Buiter ( , 2014 Buiter ( , 2017b .
Monetary policy has an inevitable fiscal dimension -one that has nothing to do with the FTPL/FTLEA. Central bank money is irredeemable and, except at the ELB, is willingly held even though it is pecuniary-rate-of-return dominated. Central banking therefore should be profitable, not only away from the ELB but even at the ELB. The fiscal theory of seigniorage recognizes that the national Treasury is the beneficial owner of the central bank and that, consequently, a monetized balance sheet expansion by the central bank increases fiscal space -relaxes the intertemporal budget constraint of the government. This fiscal space can be filled with tax cuts or higher public spending. Helicopter money is the parable of the fiscal dimension of monetary policy (see Friedman (1969) and Buiter (2003 Buiter ( , 2007 Buiter ( , 2014 ).
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains a rigorous but non-technical exposition of the main issues addressed in the paper. Section 3 provides a rigorous technical analysis of the original FTPL, which addressed a world with flexible nominal prices. We identify one inconsistency and six unacceptable anomalies. We also address the merits of treating the FTPL as an equilibrium selection mechanism when there are multiple equilibria. We extend the FTPL to an economy at the effective lower bound (ELB) and show that the most of the flaws of the FTPL are present also when the economy is at the ELB. In Section 4, we review recent attempts by Sims to make the case for non-Ricardian budgetary rules in a world with nominal price rigidities. We determine that the appropriate use by Sims of the IBC of the State in a New-Keynesian model does nothing to make a case for non-Ricardian budgetary rules. What we call Sims's fiscal theory of the level of economic activity (FTLEA) turns out to be a conventional analysis of fiscal stimulus and financial repression. The non-Ricardian budgetary rules proposed by Sims do not robustly rule out sovereign insolvency risk. The same applies to Sims's analysis of an Old-Keynesian model.
(2) The FTPL: a non-technical presentation ( 
2.A.) Key concepts and relationships
Consider a very simple closed endowment economy with two sectors: the household sector (represented by a representative household) and the State. The State (or the sovereign) is the consolidated general government and central bank. We will henceforth refer to the general government sector as the Treasury or the fiscal authority. There are no firms, because of the simple endowment technology and no financial institutions other than the central bank that is part of the State. There are four financial instruments: central bank money, which can only be issued by the State, a short (one-period or, in our continuous time formal model, instantaneous or zero-duration) nominal bond, a nominal consol (perpetuity) and a short index-linked bond. The formal model assumes there is no default and no default risk for both households and the State, so the bonds of the State and the bonds issued by the households are perfect substitutes.
We need the following terminology. The contractual value of a bond is the present discounted value (PDV) of its current and future contractual (or legally committed) debt service (interest payments or coupon payments plus repayment(s) of principal) discounted using default-risk-free discount factors. In principle, there could be other sources of risk in the economy (e.g. random shocks to the endowment, to the policy rules or to household preferences) that cause asset prices, interest rates and other endogenous variables to be different from what they were expected to be when contractual agreements were entered into. Even in the absence of uncertainty, the contractual value of longer-duration debt instruments can vary over time (as expected), as the exogenous drivers of the discount factors can be time-varying.
Formally we deal with a deterministic model without any risk or uncertainty. We do, however, adopt the common approach of considering a completely unexpected shock to one or more policy instruments. Let time, which we take to be continuous, be denoted by t . From the initial date, 
the real value of a measure of flow 'seigniorage'-central bank monetary issuance net of interest paid on central bank money, and i the short (instantaneous) nominal interest rate on non-monetary financial claims (one-period or instantaneous riskfree nominal bonds). A Ricardian budgetary rule is a set of rules for real public spending on goods and services, real taxes net of transfers, the real value of seigniorage and policy rates that ensures that the State always satisfies its intertemporal budget constraint (IBC), for all values of the policy instruments and endogenous variables (current and anticipated future discount rates, the price level, the level of real economic variables and any exogenous parameters) that enter into the intertemporal budget constraint of the State, and with sovereign debt priced at its contractual value. Under a Ricardian budgetary rule, sovereign debt will always trade at its contractual value because, by construction, the State always satisfies its IBC, using default-risk-free discount factors and with sovereign bonds priced at their contractual values.
The condition for State bonds to be priced at their contractual value is that the present discounted value (using default-risk-free discount factors) of its current and future real primary surpluses, s g Any model that prices sovereign debt at its contractual value but imposes a non-Ricardian budgetary rule should be subjected to a consistency check in the form of a counterfactual analysis: assuming that current and future discount factors are free of default risk, is the IBC of the State indeed satisfied in equilibrium with the sovereign debt priced at its equilibrium value? If the answer is 'yes', the analysis can proceed. If the answer is 'no', the bonds of the State cannot be priced at their contractual values and the assumption that default-risk-free discount factors can be used is falsified. The model is not fit for purpose. Sovereign default risk and sovereign insolvency have to be considered and modeled explicitly. The terms on which a sovereign that is in default or at risk of default has access to the bond markets have to be made explicit etc.
The consistency check for any non-Ricardian rule is performed by using the IBC of the State as a counterfactual sovereign bond pricing equilibrium condition. Let ˆ( ) s t be the real value of the augmented primary surplus of the State at time t (as defined above). Let ( ; , ) PDV x r t denote the present discounted value, at time t , of all current and future values of a real variable x over an infinite horizon when defaultrisk-free real discount factors are used to discount the future values of x ; ( ; , ) PDV y i t is the present discounted value of a nominal variable y over an infinite horizon when default-risk-free nominal discount factors are used.
( ) B t is the number of one period (instantaneous or zero-duration in continuous time) nominal government bonds outstanding at the beginning of period t (at time t in continuous time). The contractual value of such an instantaneous nominal bond is 1 unit of money.
( ) B t
 is the number of nominal consols (perpetuities) outstanding at the beginning of period t (at time t); it is a promise to pay 1 unit of money in each period (at each point in time) forever. Its nominal contractual value at time t , denoted ( ) P t  , is given by ( ) (1; , ) P t PDV i t   ; ( ) b t is the number of one-period (instantaneous) index-linked government bonds outstanding at the beginning of period t (at time t): its nominal contractual value at time t is ( ) P t , the general price level in period t (at time t) -the reciprocal of the price of money in terms of the endowment commodity.
The intertemporal budget constraint of the State at time t is the requirement that the PDV of current and future augmented primary surpluses of the State is equal to or greater than the contractual value of the outstanding non-monetary debt of the State. It can be written as follows: 
The FTPL introduces the intertemporal budget constraint of the State, holding with equality and with sovereign debt priced at its contractual value, as an additional equilibrium condition, but without adding the bond revaluation factor. So, it replaces equation (2.2) with
,
The FTPL then assumes that the general price level, 1 ( ) P t can do the job of the bond revaluation factor. With all sovereign debt priced at its contractual value, the general price level jumps to the level required to ensure that the IBC of the State, holding with equality and with sovereign debt priced at its contractual value, is satisfied. Because a negative price level is not considered acceptable, if there is a nonzero stock of net nominal government bonds outstanding, the FTPL requires:
B t PDV i t B t PDV s r t b t
Consider the empirically most interesting case where there is positive net nominal public debt outstanding:
In that case, the PDV of the augmented real primary surpluses has to be larger than or equal to the real value of the outstanding stock of index-linked public debt, if a negative price level is to be avoided. The starting point in showing that the FTPL is a fallacy is quite independent of whether equation (2.4) solves for a positive value of the general price level. Equation (2.4), the IBC of the State holding with equality and with sovereign debt priced at its contractual value, cannot be imposed by the FTPL as an additional or independent equilibrium condition in a general equilibrium model that includes household consumption behavior derived from the optimizing behavior of forward-looking households. That is because this same IBC of the State (holding with equality and with sovereign debt priced at its contractual value), or its mirror image, the IBC of the optimizing household (holding with equality and with debt priced at its contractual value), has already been used to derive the optimal consumption rule. The only qualification of this "don't use the same equilibrium condition twice" requirement is to interpret the second application to be an equilibrium selection device in a model with multiple equilibria. We show below that this qualification cannot salvage the FTPL.
(2.B.) The FTPL is invalid economic theory because it uses the same equilibrium condition twice It is intuitively obvious, and we show this rigorously in the formal model below, that, if the household utility function exhibits non-satiation (more is better) in consumption and/or real money balances, the IBC of the household will hold with equality: no resources that could be devoted to consumption or to accumulating additional real money balances are wasted.
The IBC of the household, holding with equality and with debt priced at its contractual value can, in equilibrium, be written as:  .
In equilibrium (if an equilibrium exists), the economy-wide real resource constraint holds: real output (the real endowment) equals real household consumption plus real public spending on goods and services: y c g   . Substituting the economy-wide real resource constraint into the household IBC, holding with equality and with debt valued at its contractual value turns the IBC of the household (equation (2.6)) into the IBC of the State, holding with equality and with the public debt priced at its contractual value -that is, it turns equation (2.6) into equation (2.1), holding with equality. It is a basic rule of sound general equilibrium economics that you cannot use the same equilibrium condition more than once. The FTPL therefore cannot impose the IBC of the State, holding with equality and with sovereign debt priced at its contractual value as an additional equilibrium condition when this 'additional' equilibrium condition is implied, in equilibrium, by another equilibrium condition, the IBC of the household, holding with equality and with debt priced at its contractual value, that has already been used in the derivation of the optimal household consumption rule. This fatal flaw invalidates the entire FTPL literature except for the NewKeynesian model developed in Sims (2011) , which only uses the IBC of the State (or the household sector) once. The policy conclusions Sims draws from the Sims (2011) model are invalid for other reasons, as we show informally below in this Section and formally in Section 4.
(2.C.) The original FTPL, overdetermined systems, other inconsistencies and anomalies
Because the FTPL introduces an additional equilibrium condition (the IBC of the State, holding with equality and with sovereign bonds priced at their contractual values) without adding another endogenous variable (such as ( ) D t in the standard approach of equation (2.2)), it should lead to an overdetermined system (more equations than unknows) in any model where the conventional approach yields a determinate equilibrium. And indeed, this is the case in many commonly used models, as we show in our formal model below in Section 3). There is, however, one class of models for which the standard approach results in indeterminacy of the all nominal variables -the general price level and the nominal money stock -although all real variables (including the stock of real money balances, the real interest rate, the rate of inflation, and the pecuniary opportunity cost of holding central bank money) are well-determined. This is the class of models that has a freely flexible price level and a pegged risk-free (short) nominal interest rate on bonds.
(2.C.a.) A flexible price level and a pegged nominal interest rate
When the short (instantaneous) nominal interest rate is pegged (set as an exogenous policy instrument or driven by a rule that does not make it a function of current and anticipated future nominal variables), the nominal money stock is endogenously determined. The monetary equilibrium condition in most standard models typically specifies the stock of real money balances demanded as an increasing function of some scale variable like real consumption, real output, real wealth or real transactions volumes, and a decreasing function of the difference between the short risk-free nominal interest rate on bonds and the nominal interest rate on money. In our formal models in Sections 3 and 4, real household consumption is the scale variable.
The monetary equilibrium condition can be written as
In equilibrium, in the flexible price model, real household consumption equals the exogenous level of real output, y , minus the level of real public spending on goods and services (also treated as exogenous for simplicity) g . With both the nominal interest rate on bonds and the nominal interest rate on money pegged (and assuming we are away from the effective lower bound with the safe nominal interest rate on bonds higher than the own interest rate on money), the equilibrium stock of real money balances is uniquely determined:
But neither the price level nor the nominal money stock are determined. This flexible price level, pegged nominal interest rate world is the only one where imposing the IBC of the State, holding with equality and with the sovereign debt priced at its contractual value, does not lead to a mathematically overdetermined system. We still have the fatal flow of a model that is misspecified from an economic perspective (the same equilibrium condition is imposed twice) but we don't have the problem of mathematical overdeterminacy.
The suggestion of Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999) that the FPTL be viewed as an equilibrium selection device to resolve the indeterminacy of the price level and the nominal money stock in the flexible price level model under a nominal interest rate rule is, in our view, the only conceivable rationalization for using the same equilibrium condition twice. However, in games or models with multiple equilibria, the selection mechanisms that are favored in the literature are those that select 'natural focal points'. Using the IBC of the State twice (holding with equality and with sovereign debt priced at its contractual value) does not, in our (admittedly subjective) view meet the 'natural focal point' criterion. More importantly, it does not cure the following five defects of the equilibrium selected in this manner: (1) The price level can be negative unless condition (2.5), is satisfied.
(2) The theory ceases to function when all government debt is index-linked (or, in an open economy, denominated in foreign currency). (3) The FTPL determines the price of money even in a world where there is no money except as an abstract numeraire, like phlogiston, the (imaginary) substance believed, in the pre-scientific world, to cause combustion in materials. The ability to price phlogiston, and to determine an equilibrium price without an associated quantity is a bridge too far, in our view. (4) The logic of the FTPL can be applied to the IBC of the household sector or indeed to the IBC of an individual household, as long as it has positive nominal debt outstanding, follows a non-Ricardian rule for consumption and money accumulation, and the analogue of condition (2.5) is satisfied. The household theory of the price level (HTPL) or the Joneses' theory of the price level (JTPL) have equal standing (none, that is, in our view) with the FTPL. (5) When the (counterfactual) equilibrium bond pricing equation is specified properly, say by introducing an addition endogenous variable like the bond revaluation factor D in equation (2.2) (thus introducing the market value of the bonds as a counterfactual separate variable from its contractual value), there is no FTPL. If there is positive net nominal sovereign debt outstanding, equation (2.2) determines the real market value of the outstanding public debt, Finally, if we were to accept the IBC of the State, holding with equality and with sovereign bonds priced at their contractual values, as the equilibrium selection device in the flexible price level model when the nominal interest rate is exogenous, it would surely make sense to also use it as the equilibrium selection device in the flexible price level model when the nominal money stock is exogenous. This model too has, as pointed out below in Section (2.C.b.), a continuum of price level equilibria for a given path of the current and future nominal money stock. The problem is that, in this case, the use of the FTPL equilibrium selection criterion would, almost surely, lead to the selection of a bubble equilibrium, with the real stock of money balances either exploding or imploding to zero.
(2.C.b.) A flexible general price level and a monetary rule
When the nominal money supply is exogenous or driven by a rule that does not depend on the general price level (current or future anticipated values) or anticipated future values of the nominal money stock, the equilibrium is overdetermined when we impose the IBC of the State, holding with equality and with the public debt priced at its contractual value, even when the price level is freely flexible We have two equilibrium conditions determining the price level: the monetary equilibrium condition, reproduced as equation (2.8) below and the IBC of the State, holding with equality and with sovereign priced at its contractual value, equation (2.1) holding with equality.
Some care is needed with this statement, because it is well-known that flexible price level models of the kind analyzed in the FTPL literature have infinitely many equilibria under an exogenous rule for the nominal money stock. Consider the simple case of a constant nominal money stock, a constant endowment, a constant level of real public spending on goods and services, a constant time preference rate (ensuring a constant equilibrium real interest rate) and a constant nominal interest rate on central bank money, that is below the (endogenous) short nominal interest rate on bonds.
In the standard approach (without double use of the IBC of the State) such an economy has a barter equilibrium with 1 0 ( ) P t  for all time. It has one 'fundamental' equilibrium, which will have a constant price level (and a nominal interest rate equal to the real interest rate). And it has infinitely many sunspot or bubble equilibria, which can either be inflationary or deflationary (see Buiter and Sibert (2007) . In equation (2.8), even with a constant nominal money stock, the price level can rise without bound, reducing the real money stock to zero and pushing the nominal interest rate towards infinity or it can fall without bound, raising the real money stock to zero and driving the nominal interest rate down to the ELB value of
Note that this multiplicity of equilibria is different from the indeterminacy in the conventional approach under an interest rate rule. Under the interest rate rule, neither the price level nor the nominal money stock are determined. Under the monetary rule, the nominal money stock is (by construction) determined but there is a continuum of equilibria for the price level and the nominal interest rate. Our approach in the formal model is to select among this continuum of possible solutions for the current and future price level using the equilibrium selection criterion that stationary exogenous variables support stationary endogenous variables. We view this 'fundamental' solution as the 'natural focal point'. If we select the fundamental solution, adding the IBC of the State, holding with equality and with sovereign debt priced at its contractual value, as another equilibrium condition, the model is overdetermined.
Can we use the IBC of the State as an equilibrium selection device when there is this continuum of equilibria for the price level and the rate of inflation under a monetary rule? In principle, yes, because in the absence of a 'theory of equilibrium selection rules' anything can be an equilibrium selection rule. The FTPL equilibrium selection criterion appears highly unusual, however. Why would an equilibrium condition that has already been used to construct the equilibria of a model be used again to select among the multiple equilibria of the model? In the case where the nominal money stock is constant, unless the IBC of the State picks the stationary, 'fundamental' solution by happenstance, the FTPL solutions will be inflationary or deflationary bubbles with the nominal interest rate rising without bound or falling to the level of the interest rate on money. The FTPL would, under an exogenous nominal interest rate rule (assuming a constant nominal interest rate for simplicity) produce a possibly time-varying inflation rate driven by the evolution over time of the IBC of the State, with the real interest rate endogenously determined and, in our simple model, a constant stock of real money balances.
(2.C.c.) The original FTPL and fiscal dominance
The FTPL and non-Ricardian policies are frequently identified with fiscal dominance or active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy. This makes no sense. Ricardian budgetary rules can have either monetary or fiscal dominance, as the famous 'Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic' paper by Sargent and Wallace (1981) shows. Before the public debt reaches the (exogenously given) upper bound, monetary policy is active -the growth rate of the nominal money stock is exogenous. Government borrowing is passive. Once the debt ceiling is reached, monetary growth passively finances the public-sector deficit (public spending and taxes don't change).
The fiscal dimension of monetary policy (and specifically of central bank monetized balance sheet expansion) exists even if the central bank is operationally independent and even if there is 'monetary dominance' (or active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy) rather than the 'fiscal dominance' (or active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy), that characterizes the 'Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic' model after the ceiling on the government debt-to-GDP ratio is reached. The key insight is that, given the outstanding stocks of State assets and liabilities, if you want to ensure the State remains solvent (if you want a Ricardian budgetary rule), you cannot specify monetary policy (base money issuance) and fiscal policy (public spending and taxes) independently. Either there is a cooperative solution, or there is fiscal dominance and monetary issuance becomes endogenously determined (the residual), or there is monetary dominance and public spending and/or taxation have to adjust (becomes the residual) to maintain sovereign solvency.
(2.D.) The FTPL and sticky nominal prices
When the price level is predetermined (and updated, say, through an Old-Keynesian or NewKeynesian Phillips curve), it obviously cannot jump endogenously at 1 t t  to the level required to make the IBC of the State hold with equality, with the sovereign debt priced at its contractual value. If we impose the IBC of the State as an equilibrium condition and have also used the equilibrium mirror image of the IBC of the State -the IBC of the household, holding with equality and with household debt priced at its contractual value -to determine the optimal consumption rule, the system is overdetermined. There is no 'equilibrium selection mechanism' escape valve -however unconvincing one may consider such an escape valve to be in the flexible price level models.
(2.D.a.) Sims's new FTPL -the FTLEA Sims (2011) does not fall into the overdeterminacy trap. In his analytical and numerical models, household consumption behavior is characterized by the Euler-equation for consumption (growth) -a firstorder differential equation. The IBC of the household, holding with equality and with household and sovereign debt priced at its equilibrium value -the boundary condition which, together with the Euler equation, permits one to solve for optimal consumption behavior -is replaced, as an equilibrium condition, with the IBC of the State holding with equality and with sovereign debt priced at its contractual value. This, however, does not mean that all is well with the conclusions of the Sims (2011) According to Sims these discount factors (current and anticipated future default-risk-free nominal and real interest rates) will jump in the desired manner -to ensure sovereign solvency -when a non-Ricardian rule is unexpectedly introduced at 1 t . These discount factors can indeed jump when a surprise hits the system, because household consumption, which is chosen by forward-looking optimizing households, can jump when the non-Ricardian rule is introduced unexpectedly at 1 . t Because it is not the price level that jumps but consumption, and with it the demand-determined level of real economic activity, we call the Sims (2011) New-Keynesian model the fiscal theory of the level of economic activity (FTLEA). Can a jump in consumption (and presumably, in a richer model, consumption and real capital expenditure) really do the job of setting the nominal and real discount factors at values that ensure government solvency? They could for certain non-Ricardian rules and for certain values of the exogenous variables, parameters and initial values of the predetermined state variables (we provide an example), but it is trivial to come up with examples of non-Ricardian rules that cannot do the job and will violate the IBC of the State with sovereign debt priced at its contractual value. Note that, in the flexible price level model too, nominal and real discount factors can jump, because there also, household consumption is nonpredetermined, driven by optimizing, forward-looking households. Household consumption therefore can, in principle, jump in response to news. Of course, with real government spending and real output constant, equilibrium consumption will not jump in the classical model of the original FTPL. Because of that, real interest rates too will not change in equilibrium. If the nominal interest rate is pegged at the same level in both the Ricardian regime (pre-1 t ) and the non-Ricardian regime, following the unexpected regime change at 1 t , the nominal discount factors also would not change in the flexible price level model.
Because we have no way of determining a-priori whether an arbitrary, non-Ricardian budgetary rule is consistent with government solvency when the economic model is specified properly -that is, without double use of the IBC of the State -one always should do a counterfactual analysis, using equation (2.2), to determine whether the budgetary rule in question does indeed satisfy the IBC of the State in equilibrium, holding with equality and with sovereign debt priced at its contractual value, for a robust range of initial conditions and values of the exogenous variables and parameters. If it does, all is well. If the PDV of current and future real augmented primary surpluses exceeds the real contractual value of the outstanding sovereign debt, the sovereign is wasting fiscal space. If the PDV of current and future real augmented primary surpluses falls short of the real contractual value of the outstanding sovereign debt, there is at the very least default risk and possibly actual sovereign default and sovereign insolvency. The assumptions on which the model is based -default-risk-free bond pricing -are then falsified. The household cannot satisfy its IBC with equality and with its holdings of sovereign bonds valued at their contractual values, because the market value of that sovereign debt will be less than its contractual value. Depending on the procedures for dealing with sovereign default (including the seniority of old and new creditors of the government) the terms of access of the State to the bond markets will be different. The maintained assumption of no sovereign default risk and no sovereign default have been falsified. The model is not fit for purpose.
(3) The original FTPL: a more rigorous presentation
We first state the key results concerning the original FTPL for the case where the economy is never at the ELB. We choose the sequence of nominal interest rates or the sequence of nominal money stocks in such a way that the nominal interest rate on bonds exceeds the nominal interest on money in each period.
We employ a deterministic, continuous-time model. Time, t, begins at time zero and proceeds to infinity. There is a single, perishable consumption good and the model is inhabited by an infinite-lived government and a representative infinite-lived household.
(3.A.) The State
At each instant, the state collects real taxes  and buys an amount g of the good. Variables depend on time, but this is suppressed in the notation where there is no ambiguity. The asset menu is the same as in Section 2. Notation used in Section 2 carries over to the rest of the paper.
The State's within-period budget constraint is thus
Arbitrage implies that the expected return on real bonds and the expected real return on consols must equal the expected real return on (instantaneous) nominal bonds. Thus,
where / P P    is the expected rate of inflation. With perfect foresight except at the point in time, 1 0 t t   , when the authorities switch unexpectedly from a Ricardian to a non-Ricardian budgetary rule, actual and expected returns and inflation rates are the same. Solving (3.3) forward and imposing a nobubble terminal condition yields that the price of a consol is equal to the present discounted value of its coupon payments.
Substituting equations (2) and (3) into equation (1) The no-Ponzi game or solvency constraint requires that the present discounted value of the terminal value of the State's non-monetary liabilities is non-positive in the limit as the terminal date goes to infinity:
Note that equation (3.7) does not put any restriction on what happens to the present discounted value of the terminal money supply. This is because central bank money is irredeemable: a holder of a central bank's money can never compel the central bank to exchange it for anything other than the same amount of the central bank's money. Although money is perceived as an asset by private holders, it is not in any meaningful sense a liability of the central bank. This asymmetry matters for monetary policy effectiveness at the effective lower bound (ELB) but is not relevant to our discussion of the FTPL.
Substituting equation (7) into equations (6) yields the IBC of the State:
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The terminal condition in question is lim ( ) exp ( ) 0.
Through integration by parts, it can be seen that the two flow seigniorage measures,
are related as follows:
The IBC of the State can therefore also be written as follows: 
the IBC of the State given in equation (3.8) changes to:
The equivalent version of the ICB of the State given in equation (3.10) becomes: .18), which says that the real market value of non-monetary government debt equals the PDV of the sum of current and anticipated future augmented primary surpluses, discounted using default-risk-free discount factors.
The bond revaluation factor, D , is the ratio of the market value of the debt to its contractual value. If it were a true (non-counterfactual) bond pricing equation, D satisfies the following conditions: In the equilibrium bond pricing approach, the budgetary policies are whatever they are. Essentially arbitrary sequences or rules for public spending, taxes, monetary issuance and policy rates are permitted. Such budgetary policies that are not required to satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint in and out of equilibrium, that is for all possible values of the variables entering the IBC of the State with debt priced at its contractual value, are called non-Ricardian budgetary policies.
D t D t P t B t P t B t b t r u du s v dv P t B t P t B t b t D t r u du s v dv P t B t P t B t b t
Our analysis is restricted to the case where 0 l  and the government is a net debtor. If it were a net creditor, it would be necessary to verify the solvency of those who issued the bonds held by the State.
The FTPL considers non-Ricardian budgetary programs but does not add a bond revaluation factor to the equilibrium bond pricing equation. It effectively sets ( ) 1 D t  in the counterfactual bond pricing equilibrium condition, (3.18). Since the FTPL adds an additional equation -(3.10) holding with equalitybut does not add another unknown, any model of the economy that has a determinate equilibrium under Ricardian budgetary programs should be overdetermined under a non-Ricardian budgetary program, that is, mathematically inconsistent with more equations than unknowns.
With multiple bonds, the State has to choose not just the mix of monetary financing vs. bond financing of its budget deficits, but also the composition of its bond financing.
(3.B.) The household sector
The representative household receives an exogenous endowment 0 y  each instant, consumes 0 c  and pays a net real lump-sum tax and chooses money and bond holdings. The instantaneous budget identity for the representative household is:
Solving equation (3.20) forwards to find the intertemporal budget constraint of the household yields:
v M t t v t v l t m t r u du c v i v i v m v v y v dv r u du l v m v
The household solvency constraint is the condition that the PDV of its terminal net financial debt must be non-negative
By equations (3.21) and (3.22) the intertemporal budget constraint becomes
v M t t l t m t r u du c v i v i v m v v y v dv
Using (3.9) the IBC of the representative household can equivalently be written as:
debt is issued. Once this is accepted, the nominal anchor disappears and the possibility to run "arbitrary" (nonRicardian) fiscal policies disappears as well-the price level cannot be relied upon to satisfy the IBC. If a bond revaluation factor less than 1 were to occur in the initial period when a government bond is issued, it would not be possible to price that bond at par. The State either sells it at the appropriate discount to its contractual value or the State cannot sell the bond. Niepelt's analysis and mine are substantially the same. We am indebted to Dirk Niepelt for pointing this out to us. Of course, as pointed out in Daniel (2007) , if, in that initial period, all the necessary conditions for the FTPL to generate an equilibrium price level sequence are satisfied (flexible prices, exogenous nominal interest rate, non-zero stock of government bonds), the FTPL might be able to pick a price level sequence that yields a unique, non-explosive equilibrium. This amounts to 'relocating' the FTPL to the initial period. Even if there is no inconsistency (overdeterminacy) in this case, the five anomalies introduced below still invalidate the FTPL.
If equation (3.17) hold, this becomes:
Equation (3.23) and the equivalent equation (3.24) will hold with equality if there is non-satiation in either consumption or real money balances or both. The household utility function introduced below has that property.
It is ensured that, away from the ELB, households will hold central bank money that is pecuniaryrate-of-return-dominated by bonds by making real money balances an argument in the direct utility function. Alternatively, one could specify a transactions technology where money saves on real resources or some varieties of the cash-in-advance model. The representative household takes as given its initial money and bond holdings, 
t m t rdu c v i v i v m v v y v dv t
                          ( ) ( ) exp ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) v M t t l
t m t r u du c v i v i v m v v y v dv
or, equivalently:
) ( ) ( ) ( ) v M t t l t r u du c v v i v m v v y v dv
Equations (3.30), (3.26), (3.27) and (3.28) allow us to obtain the following closed form household consumption function and money demand function: With constant consumption, the costate variable is constant and the following conditions will have to be satisfied in any equilibrium where the economy is never at the effective lower bound.
( )
M t l t m t v t i i m g dv
For non-Ricardian budgetary rules, the conventional approach should add the intertemporal budget constraint of the government, holding with equality, as a counterfactual sovereign bond pricing equilibrium condition 
D t l t v t i v i m v v g dv m t D t l t v t v i m v v g dv
Note the problem this creates: optimality conditions of the household consumption and asset allocation program imply that the IBC of the household holds with equality (equation (3.31) ). Substituting the economy-wide equilibrium condition in the output market (or the equilibrium economy-wide real resource constraint (equation (3.34)) into the household IBC, holding with equality (equation (3.31), yields equation (3.39), the IBC of the State, holding with equality and with government bonds priced at their contractual values. The FTPL cannot impose equation (3.39) because it has already been used to derive the optimal consumption program (equations (3.26) to (3.29)), and the money demand function and consumption function they imply (equations (3.33) and (3.32)).
We are now ready to consider the inconsistencies and anomalies in the FTPL.
(3.C.a.) The nominal money stock is the policy instrument
If the central bank sets the nominal stock of money either through some exogenous open-loop rule or through some feedback rule that does not depend on current and anticipated future values of the general price level and the nominal money stock, then the instantaneous nominal interest rate on bonds, i , is endogenously determined.
It is supposed that the central bank sets a constant proportional money growth rate for the nominal money stock that keeps the short nominal interest rate above the ELB. / .
It is well-known that, with flexible prices, there are infinitely many equilibria under this policy rule. There is the barter equilibrium where money has no value: 1 / ( ) 0, 0 P t t   . Then there is a continuum of non-fundamental or bubble equilibria where, despite the fact that all the exogenous variables of the model are constant, the value of real balances goes to infinity or zero. (See Buiter and Sibert (2007) 
With the initial nominal money stock given, the monetary equilibrium equation (3.43) determines the general price level, because it can be written, for 0 t  as:
Consider a simple non-Ricardian rule where the real value of the augmented primary surplus is constant:
This rule can be implemented by setting net real taxes,  at the appropriate level, which is this simple example is constant.
Under this non-Ricardian rule, the IBC of the State, holding with equality and with sovereign debt priced at its contractual values can be written as:
Assume that all three bond stocks are predetermined -there is no instantaneous 'stock reshuffling' between the three bonds. Equation (3.46) contains predetermined variables and parameters plus the general price level. It too determines a value for the general price level, alongside the monetary equilibrium condition.
Clearly, with this non-Ricardian budgetary rule, the price level determined by the monetary equilibrium condition (3.44) and the price level determined by the IBC of the State, holding with equality and with public debt priced at its contractual value, equation (3.46) will only be the same by happenstance. Under the FTPL the price level is determined twice and the model is therefore overdetermined and inconsistent.
The standard approach would be to replace (3.46) by
If equation (3.47) yields ( ) 1, 0 D t t   1, the analysis can proceed (as far as the sovereign is concerned).
Otherwise, it is back to the drawing board, because the maintained hypothesis, that sovereign debt is priced at its contractual value, is false. We summarize this discussion as follows: 
(3.C.b.) The FTPL as an equilibrium selection rule
Under our monetary rule, there is a continuum of equilibria for the general price level (and for the entire future path of the price level). We chose among them the unique 'fundamental' solution which produces a constant inflation rate when the growth rate of the nominal money stock is constant.
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It is the only solution, other than the barter solution, that does not produce explosive or implosive inflation or disinflation bubbles. We chose this unique solution because it seems to us to be a natural 'focal point': stationary inputs produce stationary outputs. Given our model selection criterion, the price level is overdetermined under the FTPL when we add the IBC of the State holding with equality and with sovereign debt priced at its contractual value.
We can get rid of the overdetermination problem while retaining the FTPL condition (3.46) if we drop our 'fundamental' equilibrium selection criterion (stationary inputs should produce stationary outputs if such equilibria exist) and replace it with the FTPL condition. Given the price level determined by the IBC of the state, equation (3.46), the nominal interest rate would be determined by the monetary equilibrium condition:
Thus, if we don't impose our equilibrium selection criterion and instead interpret the FTPL's ICB of the State in equation (3.46) as our model selection criterion, the model is no longer overdetermined. The price level at time t is determined uniquely by equation (3.46) (as long as that yields a positive value for the price level). That is the good news for the FTPL. The bad news is that, unless the price level determined by the IBC of the State in equation (3.46) also satisfies the 'fundamental' monetary equilibrium condition under the monetary growth rule (3.44), which it will only do by happenstance, the price level will either rise explosively or fall without bound. The nominal interest rate can rise without bound (with the real money stock going to zero) or fall towards the ELB level, creating an infinite demand for real money balances.
We do not consider a selection criterion that generates almost always implosive or explosive solutions for the nominal interest rate in a model where all the fundamentals are constant to be an attractive one.
We recognize, of course, that the FTPL as equilibrium selection criterion was not proposed by Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999) for the case of a flexible price level and an exogenous money supply rule. Instead it was proposed for the case of a flexible price level and an exogenous nominal interest rate rule (considered in the next sub-section). The rationale for applying a fundamentally different equilibrium selection criterion in a flex-price-exogenous-money-endogenous-interest-rate model from that applied in a flex-price-exogenous-interest-rate-endogenous-money model is, however, not apparent to us. We summarize this as follows: 
c.) The nominal interest rate is the monetary policy instrument
We now assume that the instantaneous nominal interest rate on bonds is constant at a level that keeps the economy from the ELB: ( ) .
M i t i i   (3.48)
We could allow for more elaborate exogenous (time-contingent or open-loop) rules. All results go through as long as the nominal interest rate is not made a function of current or anticipated future values of nominal variables such as the nominal money stock or the nominal price level. When the nominal interest rate is the policy instrument, the nominal stock of money is endogenous.
Equilibrium is now given by, for
The FTPL adds:
Under the standard approach, the flexible price level model with a pegged nominal interest rate produces nominal indeterminacy. Although all real variables, including the stock of real money balances are (uniquely) determined, neither the nominal money stock nor the general price level are determined.
The non-Ricardian budgetary rule under the FTPL now permits the general price level to be determined by the IBC of the state, equation (3.53), holding with equality and with the bonds priced at their contractual values. The nominal money stock is then determined from the monetary equilibrium condition (3.52). Note that the price level indeterminacy of the flexible price level with the monetary rule in the traditional approach is different from the indeterminacy under the interest rate rule. Under the interest rate rule, both the price level and the nominal money stock are undetermined.
For given initial values of the bond stocks, equation (3.53) does indeed uniquely determine the general price level. Is this the validation of the FTPL and indeed also of the model selection criterion interpretation of the imposition of the IBC of the State as an equilibrium condition -at least for the flexible price level money under an exogenous interest rate rule? The answer is a five-fold 'no'. There in nothing in equation (3.53), or its more general version
Unless this condition is satisfied, the FTPL produces a negative price level. 
The sovereign debt pricing equation sets the market value of the debt equal to the PDV of current and future primary surpluses. All it determines, however, is ( ) ( ) D t l t . In general, unless there is only index-linked debt outstanding, the general price level ( ) P t and the bond revaluation factor ( ) D t are not individually determined. Even if there is no indexlinked debt, the model only determines / D P .
Anomaly 5:
The FTPL can price phlogiston -it can determine a price without an associated quantity. Another anomaly of the FTPL is that it can determine the price of money even if money does not exist except as a numeraire. Suppose there were no money as an asset and store of value in the model. were only some imaginary concept called "money" that, for some reason, serves as the unit of account, numéraire or invoicing unit. A government bond is denominated in terms of this imaginary numeraire. The FTPL equilibrium is then given by equations (3.49), (3.50), (3.51) and (3.53). The monetary equilibrium condition vanishes, but since we lose an endogenous variable, M , we still have as many equations as unknowns. The price of money can still jump to satisfy equation (3.53).
Instead of something non-existing called 'money', we could use another abstract/imaginary numéraire -phlogiston, say. This is the substance formerly (in the pre-scientific age) believed to be embodied in all combustible materials. It this world, when the FTPL supports a positive general price level (see Anomaly 1), it manages to price non-existent phlogiston, just as it can price non-existent money. We consider this to be an undesirable, indeed unacceptable feature of the model.
To illustrate the deep conceptual bizarreness of the phlogiston economy, consider what a one-period maturity pure discount nominal bond actually is in such an economy.
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It promises, in period t, to pay the purchaser, 'something' in period t+1. That something cannot be one unit of phlogiston, because phlogiston does not exist except as a unit of account. Instead it promises to pay the holder in period t+1 something worth one unit of phlogiston in that period. How do we know what a unit of phlogiston is worth in period t+1 -in terms of things that actually exist other than as pure numéraires? We have this phlogistondenominated bond equilibrium pricing condition in every period. It tells us that the real value of the phlogiston-denominated bond, priced at its contractual value in terms of phlogiston, has to be equal to the PDV of the current and future real augmented primary budget surpluses of the State.
So, in a world where money does not exist except as a pure numéraire, a nominal phlogistondenominated bond is the ultimate non-deliverable forward contract. 10 We believe that it makes no sense to model a world where non-deliverable contracts exist without there also being a deliverable benchmark. Money has to exist either as a commodity (with or without intrinsic value) or as a (fiat) financial claim issued by some economic entity. There has to be a benchmark spot market for money and a deliverable forward contract for money if a non-deliverable forward contract for money is to make sense. In the preceding paragraph, the word 'money' can be replaced by 'phlogiston'.
The FTPL fails this test, insofar as it can price money (phlogiston) is a world where there are no deliverable spot or forward contracts for money (phlogiston). We recognize this is an anomaly rather than a logical inconsistency. We do, however, consider this anomaly to be as devastating as the logical inconsistencies inherent in the FTPL: it is inconceivable to us that one could work with a model of the economy that can determine the equilibrium price of something without an associated quantity of that something.
Anomaly 6: The HTPL or Joneses theory of the price level is as plausible as the FTPL.
Another anomaly of the model is that we can apply its central idea to the household sector as a whole or even to an individual household. In this world, the government satisfies its intertemporal budget constraint with equality, say because it follows a Ricardian budgetary rule. The representative household chooses an arbitrary (non-Ricardian) path of consumption and money holdings and, as long as its consumption and money demand is not too large relative to its income (as long as the PDV of current and future augmented primary surpluses of the household is positive) and as long as the household has a positive stock of debt outstanding, the initial price level jumps to ensure its IBC is satisfied with equality and with household debt priced at its contractual value. This gives us the household sector theory of the price level or HTPL.
Indeed, in a world with many households, we can pick out one favored household, perhaps the Joneses. Every other household and the State follow Ricardian rules and satisfy their IBCs. The Joneses are non-Ricardian. As long as the Joneses have a positive stock of nominal debt outstanding and the PDV of their current and future augmented primary surpluses is positive, the initial price level jumps to ensure that the Joneses remain solvent.
(3.D.) Equilibria at the ELB
We now consider equilibria where the economy is at the ELB. To make the point as dramatically as possible, we assume that the economy is permanently at the ELB.
Under the exogenous nominal interest rate rule this requires:
We again consider the non-Ricardian budgetary rule
. The utility function (3.25) has global non-satiation in real money balances, so the demand for real money balances is infinite at the ELB (equation (3.55) ). The only equilibrium conditions that are different at the ELB from what they are away from the ELB are the monetary equilibrium condition (3.55) and, of course, equation (3.54), which implies equation (3.56):
Monetary equilibrium requires an infinite stock of real money balances because of the non-satiation feature of the logarithmic utility function. This can be generated either by a zero price level and any finite nominal stock of money or by a positive price level and an infinite nominal money stock. In principle, at the ELB, the nominal money stock can be exogenous (policy-determined) or demand-determined and endogenous.
The infinite demand for real money balances (equation (3.55)) at the ELB is implausible both apriori and empirically. Japan, the Eurozone, Sweden and Denmark have been at the EBL for a significant amount of time, and there has been no evidence of an unbounded demand for central bank money in any of these countries. To make sure that the results don't depend on this feature, we (briefly) consider the alternative household utility function below, which exhibits satiation in real money balances when
The only thing that changes as a result of this alternative utility function is the demand for real money balances, which becomes:
The monetary equilibrium condition at the ELB becomes, instead of equation (3.55):
Note that satiation in real money balances at a finite level of real money balances only refers to the non-pecuniary, direct utility derived from money balances. Even at the ELB, money remains a valuable store of value and larger real money balances make a household better off because wealth is higher. If there is no satiation in consumption (a property of both utility functions), higher holdings of real money balances will boost household demand for consumption and the household IBC will continue to hold with equality.
There is a unique exogenous money stock rule that supports the economy being permanently at the ELB only if there is satiation in real money balances at a finite stock of real money balances at the ELB and the utility of holding real money balances declines for real money holdings larger than the satiation level (a case we don't consider because we view it as a-priori implausible). In that case:
However, if there is an infinite demand for real money balances when the pecuniary opportunity cost of holding money is zero -as there is with the logarithmic utility function of equation (3.25) -then, if the price level is positive, an infinite stock of nominal money balances will always be demanded. Even if there is satiation in real money balances at a finite stock of real money balances, but the utility of money remains constant at the satiation level when the stock of real money balances rises above the minimum level at which satiation occurs (the utility function given in equation (3.57)), the monetary equilibrium condition does not in general yield a unique price level when the nominal money stock is exogenous and the price level is freely flexible.
The direct analogue of the FTPL in an economy at the ELB with the FTPL in an economy away from the ELB is where, away from the ELB, the nominal money stock is endogenously determined -the exogenous interest rate rule. If the misspecified equilibrium bond pricing equation,
B t B t P t b t r u du s v dv
implies a positive price level, we have the FTPL again.
If there is non-satiation in real money balances, an exogenous and finite nominal money stock is only consistent with monetary equilibrium and a flexible price level if the price level is zero (equation (3.55)). That would be inconsistent with the price level implied by the misspecified bond pricing equilibrium equation (3.53) .
What happens to the ELB to Inconsistency 1 and the six Anomalies? Inconsistency 1 -a nonRicardian budgetary rule implies an overdetermined model when (a) an exogenous monetary rule setting a (finite) nominal money stock is followed, (b) we select the 'fundamental' equilibrium and (c) we impose the IBC of the State, holding with equality and with sovereign bonds priced at their contractual valuesdoes not carry over without qualifications. As we saw earlier, when there is no satiation in real money balances, the infinite demand for real money balances at the ELB can only be satisfied at a zero general price level, making the FTPL overdetermined on a monetary rule if the nominal money stock is finite. However, if there is satiation in real money balances at a finite stock of real money balances (equation (3.59) holds), the system is not necessarily overdetermined under an exogenous money supply rule even at the ELB, because, there is no unique 'fundamental' solution: as long as the exogenous nominal money stock and the (positive) price level determined by the misspecified bond pricing equilibrium condition, (3.53), satisfy equation (3.59), the monetary equilibrium condition will not uniquely determine the price level: the household is indifferent between holding real money balances in an amount 2 1 / k k and holding any amount of real money balances greater than 2 1 / k k , which can be supported with the same nominal money stock and different price levels.
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Anomaly 1, that under a monetary rule the use of the FTPL as an equilibrium selection rule almost always results in a bubble equilibrium being selected also does not occur at the ELB. Consider the case where the nominal money stock is constant and the nominal interest rate on money is less than the pure rate of time preference. It follows from equation (3.56) that the equilibrium price level will be falling. Assume that money demand is characterized by satiation at a finite level of money balances and that the FTPL picks an initial price level, at 
The FTPL and the FTLEA in sticky price level models
Because the entire thrust of the FTPL is to make the general price level do the work of the bond revaluation factor, D, it would seem pretty self-evident that in models with a predetermined or sticky general price level (any Old-Keynesian or New-Keynesian model), the FTPL would find itself facing the familiar problem of an overdetermined system, with the general price level determined twice -once by the IBC of the State and once by history. That presumption is indeed correct if, as in the original flexible price level FTPL, the IBC of the State, holding with equality and with sovereign bonds priced at their contractual values, is used twice: once to derive the optimal consumption and money demand sequences and once more to do its FTPL duty. We summarize this as Inconsistency 2. Sims, however, does not make this mistake. He constructs a conventional sticky price level NewKeynesian model (Sims (2011) ) where the IBC of the State is used (correctly) once only, and an OldKeynesian sticky price level model (Sims (2016a) ) where the IBC of the State is (correctly) not used at all. Instead of using the counterfactual market equilibrium pricing version of the IBC of the State to verify whether his non-Ricardian budgetary rules are consistent with sovereign solvency, Sims studies the 11 If, at the price level determined by equation (3.53), the real money stock is smaller than 2 1 / k k , we cannot be at the ELB.
dynamics of his models, concluding that if the behavior of the real public debt is non-explosive, for constant values of the exogenous variables, the IBC of the State, holding with equality and with the sovereign bonds priced at their contractual values, will be satisfied. That too is appropriate methodology. In other words, in his Old-Keynesian and New-Keynesian models Sims uses perfectly sound conventional analytical tools and models.
Where Sims goes wrong is in overstating the case that his non-Ricardian budgetary rules will be consistent with sovereign solvency. Thus, while Sims's New-Keynesian and Old-Keynesian models are not overdetermined, the use of non-Ricardian policy rules cannot be guaranteed to lead to public debt sequences that satisfy the IBC of the State, holding with equality and with sovereign debt priced at its contractual value.
In what follows, we shall use simplified versions of the New-Keynesian and Old-Keynesian models of Sims. This permits us to use analytical methods rather than the numerical solution methods used by Sims. No issue of any importance is missed through these simplifications, however.
Both the general price level and the rate of inflation are predetermined. The inflation rate is updated through an accelerationist Phillips curve;
Actual output, ( ) y t , can differ from the exogenous and constant level of potential output, y . Actual output is demand-determined:
We keep the rest of the model the same as before, except for the interest rate rule and the budgetary rules -the rules governing public spending, taxation and money issuance, and assume that the nominal interest rate is the policy instrument, with the nominal money stock endogenous. We restrict the analysis, for sake of brevity, to the case where the economy is not at the ELB. Sims's models are actually phlogiston models -money does not exist as an asset but only as the numeraire -so there is no ELB in his models. We also revert to the logarithmic utility function for real money balances.
The optimizing, forward-looking household whose optimal consumption and money demand are characterized by equations (3.26) through (3.29), with closed form solution for optimal consumption and money demand given in equations (3.32) and (3.33) respectively, follows a Ricardian consumption, money demand and bond holding plan and its IBC holds with equality, implying that, in equilibrium (should an equilibrium exist), the IBC of the State also holds with equality.
The model can be summarized as follows, for 0 t  :
t y t t c t t i m t r t l t
The initial conditions for the predetermined state variables are: The boundary condition for private consumption is:
Note that we assume that the dynamics of the short nominal bond stock and of the nominal consol stock are exogenously given, in equations (4.7) and (4.8), with the dynamics of the index-linked bond endogenously or residually determined.
For the moment, consider the nominal interest rate, ( ) y , the demand-determined level of real output (equation (4.9), m , the real money stock, whose value is determined by the monetary equilibrium condition (4.10), and B , the stock of short nominal bonds, obtained from equation (4.11). So, we have the same number of equations and unknowns, the same number of state variables and first-order differential equations and the right number (and type) of boundary conditions. Does that mean all is well with the FTLEA? Meeting the 'counting tests' is just a necessary condition for the system to have one or more solutions. It means that the system is not overdetermined, but the equations describing it still may not have a solution -may be inconsistent. Finally, even if the equations have one or more solutions, these solutions may not make economic sense (the JTPL and the ability to price phlogiston are two examples from the flexible price model). Note that in equilibrium, the IBC of the household and the output market equilibrium condition ( y c g   , referred to as the equilibrium real resource constraint by Sims) imply the IBC of the State. The flow budget constraint of the household and the output market equilibrium condition imply the flow budget constraint of the State. It follows that we can replace equation (4.5) by
and equation (4.16) by
Obviously, the current price level, which is predetermined, cannot do the FTPL job of ensuring that equation (4.15) holds. So what else can do the job of ensuring that, even when the government follows a non-Ricardian budgetary rule, the IBC of the State will be satisfied with equality and with the sovereign bonds priced at their contractual values? Sims (2011) argues that the nominal and real discount factors can ensure that equation (4.15) holds despite ( ) P t being given by history. Using (4.11) equation (4.15) can be written as: Simply stating this proposition ought to be enough to convince the reader that it cannot be true for arbitrary non-Ricardian policies. It is trivial to come up with non-Ricardian budgetary rules that will cause equation (4.16), to be violated in equilibrium. Consider the non-Ricardian rule in equation (4.17): Equation (4.21) can be implemented by adjusting lump-sum real net tax revenue appropriately. The interest rate rule is a Taylor rule, where the nominal policy rate increases with the excess of the inflation rate over the target rate of inflation, *  . and the output gap. Setting 1 1   means that the real policy rate rises when the rate of inflation rises; this tends to be stabilizing in a variety of models. The real augmented primary surplus equals the real interest rate bill plus some fraction of the gap between the actual real stock of debt and its target value, * l which we treat as exogenous and constant. With the Taylor rule and the convergent real public debt rule, the economic system can be reduced to a system of three first-order linear differential equations. 
13
Because this model is a special case of the model summarized in equation (4.25), the debt dynamics will once again be unstable, because the fiscal effort is unresponsive to the level of the public debt. Again, the dynamics of c and  are decoupled from the dynamics of the real debt stock. The eigenvalues driving c and  are the complex conjugate solutions to: We first analyze a stripped-down version of the Sims (2016a) model. It differs from the actual Sims (2016a) model in two ways. In the Sims (2016a) model, all exogenous variables and policy instruments follow stable, univariate, first-order dynamic systems. We assume instead that all exogenous variables and policy instruments are constant. These constant values can be viewed as the steady-state values of Sims's univariate dynamic processes for these variables. Second, Sims adds additive stochastic shocks to many of the dynamic processes of the model. We leave these out. Nothing essential is lost by these simplifications. The stripped-own model turns out to have a number of weaknesses that make it unfit 13 There are two qualifications to the absence of a financial wealth effect in the forward-looking, optimizing household consumption function. First, financial ownership claims to 'outside' assets (assets for which there is no corresponding liability, like physical capital, land and real estate will show up as wealth in the consumption function, even after consolidating the household and State IBCs. as a guide to policy. We therefore developed an alternative Old-Keynesian model that does not share these weaknesses.
The (stripped-down) Sims (2016a) 
(5) Conclusion
The fiscal theory of the price level rests on a fundamental fallacy: the confusion of the intertemporal budget constraint of the State with a misspecified equilibrium nominal bond pricing equation and the double use of this IBC. This fundamental fallacy generates a number of internal inconsistencies and anomalies that should have led to the rejection of the FTPL as a logically coherent theory. This has not happened. This paper aims to rectify that error.
The issue is not an empirical one. Neither does it concern the realism of the assumptions that are made to obtain the FTPL. It is about the flawed internal logic of the FTPL.
Interpreting the FTPL as an equilibrium selection mechanism in models with multiple equilibria does not improve matters. The FTPL remains internally inconsistent and riven with unacceptable anomalies also when the economy is at the ELB. The attempt by Sims (2011) to extend the FTPL to models with nominal price rigidity is a failure. Current and future anticipated real and nominal interest rates cannot be relied upon to ensure solvency of the sovereign when non-Ricardian budgetary rules are implemented.
The fiscal theory of the price level died for the first time more than 15 years ago. Its attempted resurrection failed. It is time to bury it again -for the last time.
